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Abstract
The paper deals with analysis of the mechanism of macroeconomic imbalance estimation 
and achieving the convergence of national economy. With this purpose the authors sum-
marized the main approaches to define the macroeconomic imbalance. In addition, the 
main indicators which influence macroeconomic imbalance are allocated. On the basis 
of obtained results, the authors offer to employ the macroeconomic imbalance procedure 
which is used in EU countries for investigation. In order to achieve this external, internal 
and employment indicators in EU were analyzed by authors. Besides, with the purpose to 
indicate Ukrainian place comparing with EU, in particular with Visegrad Countries, the 
main indicators of MIP for Ukraine were calculated by the authors. According to the re-
sults, the authors made conclusion that the Ukrainian economy can be characterized as not 
stable (as in Bulgaria, Hungary and the Slovak Republic). Moreover, the authors allocated 
for the future research the necessity to understand the power of countries impact to each 
other with the purpose to achieve and save the convergence of national economy.
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INTRODUCTION
The current situation in Ukraine can be characterized as unstable. The 
huge number of problems in the economic, political, ecological, social 
and other spheres restrain the Ukrainian development and as a conse-
quence it will be impossible to achieve the convergence of the national 
economy. Firstly, unstable political situation provokes the huge level of 
distrust towards Ukraine from the other countries. Secondly, Ukraine 
couldn’t recover after the financial crisis (2008–2009) which allocated the 
problem of estimation the macroeconomic imbalances, and in particular 
private debts and divergences in price and cost competitiveness. 
It̀ s necessary to underline, that EU integration is one of ways to recov-
er macroeconomic balance, to overcome technological backwardness, 
source of foreign investment and advanced technologies.
The results of analysis of the Ukrainian GDP before and after the EU 
integration process indicate that GDP is decreasing during 2014–2016 
(Figure 1). According to this, the decline of GDP compares to 2013 is 
7% in 2014, 9% in 2015 and 14% in 2016. First of all, it is the conse-
quence of the military confrontation in the East of Ukraine and pro-
cess of reorientation from Russian to EU market. 
The analysis of the GDP dynamics in Visegrad group counties (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic) prove that GDP after EU 
integration in 2004 has been increasing comparatively to 2000. The op-
posite situation was in 2016. Thus, compare to 2000, GDP in all analyzed 
countries increased, but less than in 2015, excluding Moldova (Table 1).
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In this case it should be underlined that EU integration can provoke some issues for Ukraine. As indi-
cate De Grauwe in his paper one of the main EU problems is the divergence of the competitive positions 
that have built up since the early 2000s. According to his assumption, this divergence has led to major 
imbalances in the Eurozone where the countries that have seen their competitive positions deteriorate 
(mainly the so-called “PIIGS” – Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) have accumulated large cur-
rent account deficits and thus external indebtedness, matched by current account surpluses of the coun-
tries that have improved their competitive positions (mainly Germany) (De Grauwe, 2012).
Thus, even before the 2008–2009 financial crisis, there was increased awareness that growing diver-
gences in inflation, price competitiveness and current account balances across the euro area and the 
EU had to be closely monitored, with a view to ensuring a smooth functioning of the monetary union 
and preventing the risk of sudden stops in capital flows. The 2008–2009 crisis was accompanied by a 
general reappraisal of risk in financial markets and acted as a trigger for a sudden stop of capital flows 
and reversals in current account financing. Initially, the impact on external financing was felt mostly in 
those non-euro area Member States that had been accumulating large current account deficits. As the 
economic and financial crisis unfolded, financial assistance was also required for some euro-area coun-
tries (The Macroeconomic, 2016).
In this direction, the first task for Ukraine is to overcome the macroeconomic imbalance and minimize 
the negative impact from the EU macroeconomic imbalance with purpose to achieve the stable eco-
nomic growth and be the equal (not as an appendage) member of EU.
Figure 1. Dynamic of GDP in Ukraine, Moldova and Visegrad Group (2000–2016), bln. euro


















































































Moldova Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovak Republic Ukraine
Table 1. Dynamics of GDP in Ukraine, Moldova and Visegrad Group (in comparison with 2000), %
Source: Data from database: World Development Indicators, December 10, 2017.
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Moldova 6% 14% 22% 31% 41% 48% 52% 64% 54% 65% 76% 74% 91% 100% 99% 111%
Czech Republic 3% 5% 9% 14% 21% 30% 37% 40% 34% 37% 39% 38% 37% 40% 46% 40%
Hungary 4% 9% 13% 18% 23% 28% 29% 30% 21% 22% 24% 22% 24% 29% 33% 30%
Poland 1% 3% 6% 12% 16% 23% 32% 37% 41% 46% 53% 55% 57% 63% 68% 57%
Slovak Republic 3% 8% 14% 20% 27% 38% 53% 62% 53% 61% 65% 68% 70% 75% 81% 77%
Ukraine 9% 15% 26% 41% 45% 55% 68% 71% 46% 52% 60% 60% 60% 50% 35% 14%
Note: color means the period after EU integration
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1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
It should be noted, that EU Regulation No. 1176/2011 
“On the prevention and correction of macroeconom-
ic imbalances” defines a macroeconomic imbalance 
as “any trend giving rise to macroeconomic develop-
ments, which are adversely affecting, or have the po-
tential to adversely affect, the proper functioning of 
the economy of a Member State or of the Economic 
and Monetary Union, or of the Union as a whole”, 
while excessive imbalances are severe imbalanc-
es that jeopardize or risk jeopardizing the proper 
functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). 
In general, any deviation from a desirable level can be 
considered as an imbalance. However, not all imbal-
ances are detrimental or require policy interventions 
as they may be part of an economy’s dynamic adjust-
ment. Imbalances that require close monitoring and 
possibly policy interventions relate to developments 
that could imply threats to macroeconomic stabili-
ty. For example, having a large and persistent current 
account deficit could be considered an imbalance 
when reflecting an excess of imports over exports re-
lated to competitiveness problems (Regulation, 2011). 
Knight and Wang Wei highlighted two types of im-
balances: internal and external. Underlying that for 
both the internal and external imbalance is the in-
ter-temporal distribution of consumption: 
1) more investment relative to consumption in the 
present raises consumption in the future;
2) more exports relative to imports increases for-
eign assets, so making resources available for 
consumption in the future (Knight & Wang Wei, 
2011). 
According to the official EU report “How to Deal 
with Macroeconomic Imbalances?”, macroeconom-
ic imbalances refer to the existence of distortions in 
the external position, i.e. the current account of the 
Member States, vis-à-vis each other, rather than the 
position of the whole area vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world (Gros, 2012).
Wieser in his work (Wieser, 2011) defined macroe-
conomic imbalance as the (negative or positive) po-
sition of a domestic, external or financial variable 
which may (if uncorrected over time) make the na-
tional savings/investment balance so untenable that 
it self-corrects abruptly, thereby causing significant 
adjustment shocks. 
Fatas approved the following thoughts that the cur-
rent recession is fundamentally linked to excess-
es in financial markets and asset prices; there were 
still some classic macroeconomic imbalances that 
preceded the crisis (Fatas, 2009).
In the paper (Essl, 2011) the macroeconomic imbal-
ance was characterized as a current account deficit 
and current account surplus. Some scientists sug-
gested that monetary unions strengthen the interac-
tions of macroeconomic imbalances.
Summarizing the results of analyzing, traditionally, 
macroeconomic imbalances are defined as the ma-
jor differences between supply and demand or some 
distortions in one or more sectors that affect the en-
tire economy. Correcting macroeconomic imbalanc-
es can also help to achieve the targets for macroeco-
nomic convergence. 
The obtained results showed that EU authorities and 
huge number of scientists have been working on 
some indicators of macro-economic imbalance to 
define the risk for public debt sustainability in EU. 
Some researchers proposed to draw attention on the 
indicators to estimate EU debt crisis and determined 
that large composite indicators have a higher predic-
tive power.
According to the (Tunay, 2016) EU macroeconom-
ic imbalance influences on the emerging economy, 
including Ukraine. In this direction, it is necessary 
to understand the level and power of impact on 
Ukrainian economy. Furthermore, the Ukrainian 
macroeconomic imbalance should be assessed with 
the purpose to implement corrective mechanism 
and prevent the negative consequences of macroeco-
nomic imbalance. 
2. METHODS
The research is based on the traditional methods of 
scientific knowledge:  analysis and synthesis – in 
identifying trends of EU countries’ development 
and their process to achieve the convergence of 
4
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national economy; comparison and compilation – 
due to the analyzing the EU experience to achieve 
the macroeconomic balance;  the statistical and 
mathematical methods - due to the evaluation 
the macroeconomic imbalance in Ukraine and 
Visegrad countries; the scientific support meth-
ods – to summarize and to formulate conclusions. 
These approaches allow allocating the challenges 
and perspectives of Ukraine economy on the way 
to achieve the convergence of national economy. 
In addition, it gives opportunity to take into ac-
count the best EU practice with purpose to adopt 
the national policy and strategy. The purpose of 
the paper is to evaluate the sources of macroeco-
nomic imbalances in Ukraine. Allocation of main 
sources of imbalances is an important aspect in 
policy to achieve the convergence of national 
economy. In addition, the EU macroeconomic 
imbalances should be estimated in order to assess 
their impact on the Ukrainian economy.
3. RESULTS
It should be noticed, that new macroeconomic im-
balance procedure (MIP) was introduced in 2011, 
after the financial crisis showed that macroeco-
nomic imbalances – such as a large current ac-
count deficit or a real estate bubble – in one coun-
try can affect others.
According to EU commission the MIP aims to 
identify, prevent and address the emergence of po-
tentially harmful macroeconomic imbalances that 
could adversely affect economic stability in a par-
ticular EU country, the euro area, or the EU as a 
whole.
The analysis in the alert mechanism report (AMR) 
builds on the economic reading of a scoreboard of 
14 headline indicators covering the most relevant 
areas of macroeconomic imbalances, competitive-
Figure 2. The scheme of measuring the macroeconomic imbalance
Source: Compiled by authors based on (Scoreboard, 2017).
MAIN INDICATORS
EXTERNAL IMBALANCES INTERNAL IMBALANCES EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS
AUXILIARY INDICATORS
• Nominal unit labour cost index (2010 = 100);
• Unit labour cost performance related to the
euro area;
• House price index (2010=100) – nominal;
• Residential construction;
• Private sector debt, non-consolidated;
• Financial sector leverage, non-consolidated;
• Employment rate;
• Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training;
• People at risk of poverty or social exclusion;
• At risk of poverty after social transfers rate;
• Severely materially deprived people;
• People living in households with very low
work intensity
• Real GDP;
• Gross fixed capital formation;
• Gross domestic expenditure on R&D;
• Current plus capital account (Net lending
borrowing);
• Net external debt;
• Foreign direct investment in the reporting
economy – stocks;
• Net trade balance of energy products;
• Real effective exchange rates – euro area
trading partners;
• Export performance against advanced;
• Economies;
• Terms of trade;
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ness, and adjustment issues. These 14 indicators 
are complemented by 25 auxiliary indicators pro-
viding additional information (Figure 2).
The scoreboard is designed to capture the most 
relevant internal and external aspects of mac-
roeconomic imbalances through a limited set 
of relevant indicators of high statistical quality 
(Macroeconomic, 2017).
The headline indicators consist of the following 
14 indicators and indicative thresholds, covering 
the major sources of macroeconomic imbalances 
(Table 2).
It should be underlined that according to the MIP 
for the calculation of some of the headline indica-
tors is used GDP as a denominator. The variable 
used is GDP at market prices, sourcing from the 
National accounts. Thus, the main indicators us-
ing GDP or other data from the national accounts 
as a denominator or as a basis for compilation of 
the indicator are:
1. Current account balance.
2. Net international investment position.
3. Nominal unit labor cost.
4. Private sector credit flow (consolidated).
5. Private sector debt (consolidated).
6. Financial sector corporations’ liabilities.
7. General government gross debt.
8. House price index.
According to the abovementioned mechanism the 
macroeconomic imbalance of EU countries in 
2016 were estimated. The results of calculations 
are presented in the Table 3. 
The results of analysis indicated, that among 
the external indicators in most countries net 
international investment position as percent of 
GDP is less than thresholds –35%. Other indi-
cators correspond with the thresholds. Through 
the internal indicators, the most countries don’t 
correspond with the thresholds on the follow-
ing indexes: Private sector debt (consolidated) 
in % of GDP; Year-on-year changes in house 
prices relative to a Eurostat consumption def la-
tor (HP); General government sector debt in % 
of GDP (GGS). It should also be underlined that 
unemployment rate in the half of EU is higher 
than thresholds 10%.
In 2016 only Luxemburg has the youth unemploy-
ment rate – 2.2%. Other EU countries have the less 
than thresholds –2.0%.
Table 2. The main indicators to measure the macroeconomic imbalances















3-year backward moving average of the current account balance as percent of 
GDP (CAB) +6% and –4%
Net international investment position as percent of GDP(NIIP) –35%
5-year percentage change of export market shares measured in values(EMS) –6%
3-year percentage change of the real effective exchange rates based on HICP/
CPI deflators, relative to 41 other industrial countries(REER)
for countries
euro area non-euro area 
–/+5% –/+11%














Private sector debt (consolidated) in % of GDP (PSD) 133%
Private sector credit flow in % of GDP (PSC) 14%
Year-on-year changes in house prices relative to a Eurostat consumption 
deflator (HP) 6%
General government sector debt in % of GDP (GGS) 60%
3-year backward moving average of unemployment rate (UR) 10%















S 3-year change in p.p. of the activity rate (AR) –0.2%
3-year change in p.p. of the long-term unemployment rate (LUR) +0.5%
3-year change in p.p. of the youth unemployment rate (YUR) +2%
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The analysis of the Visegrad Countries during 2014–
2016 revealed that all external indicators of MIP are 
in the thresholds, excluding the net internation-
al investment position as percent of GDP (Figure 
3). Thus, 3-year backward moving average of the 
current account balance as percent of GDP, 5-year 
percentage change of export market shares meas-
ured in values, 3-year percentage change of the real 
effective exchange rates based on HICP/CPI defla-
tors, relative to 41 other industrial countries, 3-year 
percentage change in nominal unit labor cost are in 
the framework of the thresholds (Table 4). 
Table 3. MIP Scoreboard 2016
Source: Compiled by authors based on (Commission, 2017; The indicators, 2017).
Countries
External imbalances Internal imbalances Employment indicators
CAB NIIP REER EMS NULC HP PSC PSD GGS UR FL AR LUR YUR
BE –0.3 51.2 –0.4 –2.31 –0.6 1.00 13.3 190.1 105.7 8.3 1.2 0.1 0.1 –3.6
BG 1.8 –47 –4.7 8.15 9.50 7.10 4 104.9 29 9.4 11.1 0.3 –2.9 –11.2
CZ 0.5 –24.6 –3.7 2.86 2.9 6.70 4.4 68.7 36.8 5.1 14.5 2.1 –1.3 –8.4
DK 8.4 54.8 –1.5 –4.23 3.4 4.2 –10.4 210.7 37.7 6.3 3.3 1.90 –0.40 –1
DE 8.1 54.4 –2.6 2.79 5.2 5.4 3.8 99.3 68.1 4.6 5.2 0.3 –0.6 –0.7
EE 1.4 –37.1 4.5 –0.73 13.4 3.8 5.9 115.4 9.4 6.8 7.2 2.4 –1.7 –5.3
IE 5.5 –176.2 –6.6 59.75 –20.5 6.60 –19 278.1 72.8 9.5 2.5 0.7 –3.6 –9.6
EL –1 –139.4 –3.9 –18.95 –3.30 –2.00 –1.70 124.70 180.8 25 –16.6 0.7 –1.5 –11
ES 1.4 –83.9 –4.3 2.18 0.40 4.7 –1.00 146.70 99 22.1 0.9 –0.1 –3.5 –11.1
FR –0.7 –15.7 –3.1 –2.42 1.40 1 6.20 146.90 96.5 10.3 4.3 0.7 0.2 –0.3
HR 2.9 –70.1 0.1 8.12 –5.90 2.1 –0.10 106.10 82.9 15.6 2.5 1.9 –4.4 –18.1
IT 2.1 –9.8 –3.4 –2.83 1.9 –0.80 0.6 113.6 132 12.1 3.2 1.5 –0.2 –2.2
CY –3.6 –127.8 –6.5 –3 –6.20 1.6 10.20 344.60 107.1 14.7 0.7 –0.2 –0.3 –9.8
LV –0.3 –58.9 4.9 9.25 16.5 7.4 0.3 88.3 40.6 10.1 5.8 2.3 –1.7 –5.9
LT –0.3 –43.2 5.4 5.38 14.7 4.5 4.3 56.2 40.1 9.2 16.3 3.1 –2.1 –7.4
LU 5 34.7 –1.5 26.17 2.5 5.9 1.5 343.6 20.8 6.3 7.5 0.1 0.4 2.2
HU 3.6 –65 –5 –0.37 3.3 13.6 –3.6 77 73.9 6.5 19.5 5.4 –2.5 –13.7
MT 6.7 47.6 –2.5 8.66 –0.1 4.80 11.1 128.4 57.6 5.3 1.7 4.1 –1 –2
NL 8.8 69.1 –2.3 0.09 –1.10 4.4 1.50 221.50 61.8 6.8 5.30 0.3 0 –2.4
AT 2.2 5.6 1 –3.99 5.8 7.2 3.2 124 83.6 5.8 –2.4 0.7 0.6 1.5
PL –1 –60.7 –5 18.13 2.10 2.5 4.7 81.6 54.1 7.6 8.9 1.8 –2.2 –9.6
PT 0.3 –104.7 –1.9 5.75 0.90 6.1 –2.20 171.40 130.1 12.6 –0.2 0.7 –3.1 –9.9
RO –1.3 –49.9 –2.5 23.58 6.00 6.5 0.60 55.80 37.6 6.5 7.6 0.7 –0.2 –3.1
SI 5.1 –36.9 –0.5 3.98 0.7 3.6 –0.8 80.5 78.5 8.9 3.2 1.1 –0.9 –6.4
SK –0.7 –62.4 –1.6 7.29 3.5 7 9.2 94.7 51.8 11.5 8.5 2 –4.2 –11.5
FI –1.2 –2.3 0.5 –14.09 2.1 –0.3 2.2 149.3 63.1 9 4.5 0.7 0.6 0.2
SE 4.6 11.2 –9.2 –7.92 2 7.6 7.6 188.5 42.2 7.4 9 1 –0.1 –4.7
UK –5.5 –1.1 0.2 –0.12 3.1 5.5 8.2 168.1 88.3 5.4 11.6 0.9 –1.4 –7.7
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It should be noticed, that Ukrainian official da-
tabases don’t correspond to the EU databases; as 
a consequence it is very difficult to analyze the 
microeconomic imbalance according to the MIP, 
making the deviations in the calculations. So, it is 
necessary to adopt Ukrainian statistics according 
to the EU standards. 
However, the results of analysis revealed that 
Ukraine has approximately the same results as 
Visegrad Countries in 2016 on external and inter-
nal imbalances, employment indicators. The ob-
tained results of the internal indicators are shown 
at the Figure 4.
Table 4. The external indicator of MIP (excluding NIIP) of the Visegrad Group in 2014–2016
Source: Compiled by authors based on (Commission, 2017; The indicators, 2017)
Countries
CAB REER EMS NULC
2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016
CZ –0.6 0 0.5 –10 –8.1 –3.7 –5.82 –1.81 2.86 4 0.1 2.9
HU 2.3 2.9 3.6 –6.8 –7.1 –5 –16.32 –7.76 –0.37 5.9 –0.2 3.3
PL –2.4 –1.3 –1 –1 –1.3 –5 5.15 9.57 18.13 2.9 0.3 2.10
SK 1.3 0.4 –0.7 1.2 –1.1 –1.6 2.33 4.51 7.29 1.8 2.4 3.5
Figure 3. Net international investment position as percent of GDP  
of the Visegrad Countries, 2014–2016










Figure 4. The internal indicator of MIP (excluding HP) of Visegrad Group and Ukraine in 2014–2016
Source: Compiled by authors based on (Commission, 2017; The indicators, 2017; Macroeconomic, 2017)
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It should be noted, that among the internal in-
dicators, house price index in Ukraine (in 2014), 
Slovak Republic (2015, 2016) and Hungary (2016) 
is higher than thresholds – 6% (Figure 5).
The third block of MIP indicators are employ-
ment indicators. According to the calculation 
in all Visegrad Countries as in Ukraine all em-
ployment indicators (3-year change in p.p. of 
the activity rate; 3-year change in p.p. of the 
long-term unemployment rate; 3-year change in 
p.p. of the youth unemployment rate) are in the 
thresholds. The calculated results are presented 
at the Figure 6.
CONCLUSION
The results of the analysis revealed that MIP indicators in some of the EU countries correspond to the 
indicators’ thresholds, in some of them – not. In this case, it is necessary to understand and estimate 
changes’ influence in some countries on others. Besides, the Ukrainian indicators correspond with such 
countries as Bulgaria, Slovak Republic, and Hungary, which economies can’t be characterized as a sta-
ble. On the other hand, Ukraine has already started the EU integration process and it is necessary to 
Figure 5. House price index in Ukraine and Visegrad Countries, 2014–2016












Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia Ukraine thresholds min
Figure 6. The employment indicators of the macroeconomic imbalance estimation  
in Ukraine and Visegrad Countries, 2014–2016
Source: Compiled by authors on the literature basis 
(Commission, 2017; The indicators, 2017; Macroeconomic, 2017).
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understand all consequences and opportunities of that process for Ukraine in order to achieve the con-
vergence of national economy. The main direction for further investigations is the estimation how the 
EU integration process influence the Ukrainian MIP indicators.
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